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Abstract 
 
 
Since 1992, India has grown as a global player in the finance world. In spite of its 
success, India has not been able to rid itself of potentially harmful practices. One such practice is 
the issuing of Participatory Notes (PN) to foreign investors, so that they can anonymously 
purchase securities or derivatives listed on the Indian Stock Exchanges. This instrument came 
into public view when it accounted for approximately 50% of all foreign portfolio assets in India. 
Since then, the laws regarding PNs have evolved to become a more transparent version of the old 
rules. Although PN levels are not close to as high as 2007, a rising trend in PNs has been 
observed from September to November 2012. Regulation may have helped figure out who the 
end PN holder is, but it has not helped mitigate the inherent volatility that some scholars argued 
PNs had. This paper follows previous researchers claims to try to resolve the issue using rigorous 
econometric analysis. It uses the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) Model to find the coefficient of 
change in Participatory Note volume when regressed against the U.S. Dollar Indian Rupee 
Nominal Exchange Rate. Although the model’s results are interpreted, a problem of serial 
correlation existed in the model, thus impairing the results. 
  
	   3	  
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank Claremont McKenna College for being a home, (really far) away 
from home. Before I came here, I had no idea it was possible to learn, while living in North 
Quad. Although, I might not leave here with a stellar academic performance, I will leave here 
with a much larger, and more diverse, pool of knowledge. I will leave smarter, and much more of 
a global citizen than I was before I transferred to CMC. Most importantly, I will leave here 
longing to come back. 
I would like to thank my teachers and professors for inculcating copious amounts of 
knowledge in me, even though I’ve never understood how they did it in face of my laissez-faire 
attitude. In this regard, I would like to mention Professor Meulbroek, who even though, I was 
told, had an aversion to my type, still managed to cultivate a passion for finance in me. 
 In light of my Senior Thesis, it would be tantamount to treason if I didn’t mention the 
amazing support I have gotten from the administrative staff at this school. All the way from 
Dean Maraña being at my bedside even before I completely realized I was at a hospital,1 to my 
cleaners Lisa and Ilma who always had my back, and Mrs. Morgan, who somehow managed to 
keep track of me, and simultaneously, all the other students at school. I would also like to thank 
Professor Willett for being my reader under unorthodox circumstances, and for his invaluable 
input.  
 I would like to thank all the friends I’ve made at CMC, and the other Claremont Colleges, 
for supporting me. Last, but definitely not the least, I would like to thank my parents for all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sports injury 
	   4	  
love and support they’ve given me throughout my entire life. I wouldn’t be writing this paper 
without it. 
  
	   5	  
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
I. Abstract………..…………………………………………………………………. 2 
II. Acknowledgements...…………………………………………………………….. 3 
III. List of Abbreviations...…………………………………………………………… 6 
IV. Background..……………………………………………………………………… 8 
a. 1991 Balance of Payments Crisis  ...……………………………………… 8 
b.Post-Crisis Reforms...……………………………………………………… 10 
c. Foreign Institutional Investor ...…………………………………………… 12 
V. Participatory Notes...……………………………………………………………… 16 
a. Regulatory Timeline.....…………………………………………………… 19 
VI. Literature Review.....…………………………………………………..………….. 22 
VII. Data and Methodology..…………………………………………………………… 24 
VIII. Analysis  ..…………………………………………………………………………. 28 
IX. Discussion ..……………………………………………………………………….  33 
X. Conclusion .……………………………………………………………………….  35 
XI. Works Cited .……………………………………………………………………… 37 
XII. Appendix A: STATA Input and Output.. ………………………………………… 39
       
 
  
	   6	  
List of Abbreviations 
 
  
General 
 
1. AuC – Assets Under Custody 
2. BoP – Balance of Payments 
3. BSE – Bombay Stock Exchange 
4. DFI – Development Finance Institutes 
5. DTAA – Double Tax Avoidance Agreement 
6. ECB – External Commercial Borrowings 
7. FDI - Foreign Direct Investor 
8. FERA – Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
9. FII – Foreign Institutional Investor 
10. FVCI – Foreign Venture Capital Invesment  
11. IMF - International Monetary Fund 
12. INR – Indian National Rupee 
13. KYC – Know Your Client 
14. MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 
15. NRI – Non-Resident Indian 
16. NSE – National Stock Exchange 
17. ODI – Overseas Derivative Instrument 
18. PN – Participatory Note 
19. RBI – Reserve Bank of India 
20. PIO – Person of Indian Origin 
21. SEBI – Securities and Exchange Board of India 
	   7	  
22. SEC – Securities and Exchange Commision 
23. QFI – Qualified Foreign Investor 
24. USD – United States Dollar  
 
Data and Analysis 
1. ARCH – Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
2. GARCH – General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
3. M3 – Broad Money 
4. VAR – Vector Autoregression 
5. USDXY – US Dollar Spot Rate Index 
6. AUCNPN – Assests under FIIs, not including Participatory Notes 
 
  
	   8	  
Background 
 
 
 
India is a unique country in many ways. The structure of India’s economy has evolved in 
a unique manner over its independent history. Politically, it has undergone an interesting 
metamorphosis. Numerous kingdoms ruled India before the British colonized and unified the 
country in the 19th century. After achieving independence in 1947, India decided to remain non-
aligned during the Cold War, in its quest to maintain strategic autonomy and economic 
independence. This political sentiment had an immense impact on the development of India’s 
economy. India’s early leaders instituted a state-controlled economic system, dubbed the  
“Licence Raj”, and it existed from independence until its eventual dismantling at the end of the 
Cold War in the early 1990s.  
`“Licence Raj” is translated into English as the ‘rule of licenses’. The term refers to the 
Soviet-inspired central planning approach that India adopted, following its independence in 
1947.  Although the private sector was nominally allowed to operate, it could only do so after 
facing numerous regulations, permits, and quotas that together served as symbols of India’s 
infamous red tape bureaucracy. Effectively, the only significant private industries in India prior 
to economic liberalization were firms that were supported by the state through special licenses 
and permits. 
 
1991 Balance-of-Payments Crisis 
In the 1980’s, India ushered in a period of relatively unprecedented economic growth 
through a rapid escalation of public expenditure, which was financed by unsustainable 
borrowing.  By 1985, the Rupee began to depreciate against the dollar, boosting exports. In spite 
of this jump in exports, the soaring debt caused an increase in the current account deficit from 
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1.7% of GDP in 1981 to 3.1% of GDP in 1989.2 In 1990, India’s exports crashed, as a result of 
economic slowdowns in India’s biggest export partners. Credit started freezing up as a result of a 
downgrade of government debt from investment grade to junk. India’s foreign exchange reserves 
had dropped to merely 7 weeks worth of exports by mid 1990, when the Gulf War began. This 
war led to a global oil supply shock, and Indian exports began to dry up. On the other hand, 
petroleum imports to India increased by more than 2 billion USD.3 This exacerbation of the 
current account deficit spilled over to affect the capital account. Political instability, a credit 
crunch, and the current accounts crisis led to a dip in investor confidence. While investors began 
to pull their money out, creditors refused to buy short-term debt, and NRIs (Non-resident 
indians, or Indian expatriates), the only significant source of foreign portfolio investment at the 
time, began to rapidly pull their money out of India4. This balance of payments crisis manifested 
itself as the foreign exchange reserves fell to three weeks worth of imports. The urgency of this 
crisis was evident when the Finance Minister told parliament that the crisis “constitutes a serious 
threat to the sustainability of growth processes and orderly implementation of our development 
programs.”5 In order to avoid default, India used all its gold reserves as collateral to secure a loan 
of 1.8 billion dollars from the IMF in January 1991.6 
The Indian government secured the IMF loan during the interim tenure of the Janata Dal 
(Secular) government. Elections were scheduled for May 1991, but were delayed till June 
because of the assassination of a prominent opposition candidate and former Prime Minister, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 India,	  1991	  Country	  Economic	  Memorandum.	  Vol.	  1.	  World	  Bank,	  1991	  
3 Bery, Suman, Bosworth, Barry P. and Panagariya, Arvind. India Policy Forum 2009/10. 
Volume 6: Editors' Summary. Brookings Institute, July 2009 
4 Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Chaman Saxena. "What caused the 1991 currency crisis in India?." 
IMF Staff Papers (2002): 395-425. 
5 Budget Speech 1991-92. Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance. 24th July, 1991 
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs199192.pdf 
6 India,	  1991	  Country	  Economic	  Memorandum.	  Vol.	  1.	  World	  Bank,	  1991 
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Rajiv Gandhi. In June, the minority coalition government of P.V. Narasimha Rao was elected, 
and it pioneered sweeping reforms under its new Finance Minister, the economist and former 
RBI governor, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Although some of the improvements were covenants of the 
IMF loan, the government indicated its intention to bring about an era of liberalization in all 
sectors of the economy, including crucially, in the financial sector.  	  
Post-Crisis Reforms 
In order to comply with the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, India was forced to 
undertake many important changes in its fiscal and monetary policy. The High Level Committee 
on Balance of Payments (henceforth Rangarajan Committee) and the Committee on Financial 
Sector Reforms (henceforth Narasimham Committee), were set up to leverage these changes to 
create a strategy for future growth. To rebuild foreign exchange reserves, and begin the 
implementation of market reforms, the new government devalued the Rupee by 23% against the 
dollar.7 The Rangarajan committee suggested the introduction of a floating exchange rate, and 
current account convertibility.  As recommended by the Narasimham committee, the government 
also decided to deregulate interest rates, and allowed prices to be determined by the market. 
Credit controls were withdrawn, and there was a decrease in the reserve requirements.8 
Entrepreneurship was allowed to thrive when the barriers to entry were lowered, even though 
many industries remained under government control. The financial industry was given special 
attention because of its central role in promoting investment to drive future growth. The state-
owned banks were consolidated, and Development Finance Institutes that supplied directed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 India,	  1991	  Country	  Economic	  Memorandum.	  Vol.	  1.	  World	  Bank,	  1991 
8 Bhasin, Niti. Banking and financial markets in India, 1947 to 2007. New Century Publications, 
2007. 
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credit were abolished or converted into commercial banks. This paved the way for increased 
private competition, and the entry of foreign banks. Foreign investment in India was encouraged 
as a result of more conducive laws, lower barriers to entry, and the convertible Rupee. For 
example, foreign controlling interest of businesses in India was allowed, for the first time, in 
high priority industries and export driven companies.9  In November 1992, the National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) was incorporated in order to implement international best practices in 
secondary markets. The NSE provided investors exposure to Capital Markets (Equity) and 
Wholesale Debt Markets. The Narasimham committee recommended that the Reserve Bank of 
India be made the sole monetary and banking authority, independent of government intervention.  
In order to ensure well-rounded reforms, a recently set up regulatory body was given full 
statutory power under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act of 1992. SEBI’s 
role was modeled on the United States’ SEC, with a function to “protect the interests of investors 
in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market.”10  
Since the effort to introduce free market policies in India, there have been incremental 
changes in the structure of the financial sector. Today it is a curious contradiction between 
international best practices and archaic rules. Although India is still an emerging market, some 
ascribe its step-by-step growth strategy to its resilience against global financial crises. On the 
other hand, the continuing lack of transparency in certain peculiar financial instruments has 
served as a conduit for political corruption. This paper examines the effect of one such opaque 
instrument, Participatory Notes. The next section discusses the prime users of these instruments, 
Foreign Institutional Investors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Budget Speech 1991-92. Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance. 24th July, 1991 
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs199192.pdf 
10 The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act (1992), www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act15ac.pdf 
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Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) 
After the collapse of the “Licence Raj”, India realized that it was time to globalize. In his 
1991 interim budget speech, Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said, “we have now reached 
a stage in development where we should welcome, rather than fear, foreign investment.”11 
Although the official commencement date was 14th September 1992, FII inflows began in 
January 1993.12 
Today, there are multiple avenues for foreigners to invest in India. These can be 
categorized as Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment, Depository Receipts, External 
Commercial Borrowing (ECB), and External Assistance. 
Direct Investment is defined as equity investments in Indian companies without using the stock 
markets. It is divided into investments in listed companies, called Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and unlisted companies called Foreign Venture Capital Investment (FVCI). FDI can be 
subdivided into two investment routes, the Automatic Route and the Government Route. As one 
can infer from their names, the latter requires approval from the Government whereas the former 
has pre-existing procedures for investment. Depository Receipts are derivatives that map the 
movement of Indian stocks on foreign stock exchanges. Indian companies issue these receipts, 
which do not have any end-user restrictions. ECB is method of investment that allows Indian 
companies, both private and public, to raise money internationally. This includes bank loans, 
trade credit, and other securitized instruments. External Assistance is aid that India receives from 
foreign governments. Portfolio Investment is defined as investments in India through the stock 
market or mutual funds. There are three classifications of portfolio investors. The first, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Budget Speech 1991-92. Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Finance. 24th July, 1991 
http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs199192.pdf 
12 Indian Securities Market Volume XIV 2011, www.nseindia.com/content/us/ismr_full2011.pdf 
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newest is a Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI). QFIs are defined as non-Indians who are residents 
of Financial Action Task Force countries, and are required to have a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with SEBI through their country.13 This is a recently introduced catchall 
category for individuals who are not registered through other routes, but can accept Indian tax 
obligations.14 The second type of investor is a Non-Resident Indian (NRI) or a Person of Indian 
Origin (PIO). The Indian government officially assigns these self-explanatory terms to people 
who possess NRI or PIO identification cards. People from both these categories are allowed to 
own a maximum of 5% of an Indian company.15 They are also allowed to invest in government 
securities and corporate debt. 
The third, and biggest category by Assets Under Custody (AuC), is the Foreign 
Institutional Investor (FII).  In order to be considered as an FII, applicants need to have a proven 
track record and be overseen by their respective regulatory authority. Although there are 
exceptions to that rule, FII’s are generally one of the following institutions: university funds, 
endowments, foundations, charitable trusts, pension funds, mutual funds, investment trusts, 
insurance firms, reinsurance firms, international or multilateral organizations or one of its 
agencies, or a Foreign Governmental Agency. It could also be “an asset management company, 
investment manager or advisor, bank or institutional portfolio manager, established or 
incorporated outside India and proposing to make investments in India on behalf of broad based 
funds16 and its proprietary funds, if any.”17 As of the 30th of November 2012, 1752 FII’s are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 RBI FAQ, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=26  
14 ibid 
15 ibid 
16 Broad based fund is defined as one with a minimum of 20 investors, in which the majority 
shareholder owns less than 49%  
17 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995. 
www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act07a.html 
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registered with SEBI.18 Not only do FIIs trade for themselves, but they also trade for their 
clients, who are known as sub-accounts. These sub-accounts do not have to be regulated to be 
able to register with SEBI. On the contrary, High Net Worth (over $ 50 mil)19 Individuals can 
register as sub-accounts. On November 30th 2012, SEBI had 6306 sub-accounts registered. 
SEBI limits and regulations on FIIs have been amended and relaxed over time. In 1998 
FIIs were first allowed access to the debt market. There are also some restrictions on the 
investments that FIIs, and their sub-accounts, can make. Foreign Corporates and Foreign 
Individuals are allowed to invest up to 5% of a company’s paid-up capital. FIIs are allowed to 
invest 10% for themselves, and for all the other types of sub-accounts. Including all their sub-
accounts, FIIs are not allowed to hold more than 24% of the total firm capital.20 This limit can be 
lifted up to the statutory limit, on the behest of the Board of Directors of the company in 
question. As of today, there are over 290 Indian companies in which FIIs own over 30% of the 
paid-up capital.21 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/investment/FIITrendsNew.jsp 
19 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995. 
www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act07a.html 
20 Indian Securities Market Volume XIV 2011, www.nseindia.com/content/us/ismr_full2011.pdf 
21 List of Foreign Investment in Indian Companies. RBI. 
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_FiiUSer.aspx 
	   15	  
22 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Indian Securities Market Volume XIV 2011, www.nseindia.com/content/us/ismr_full2011.pdf	  
Figure 1: Net Investments by, and Number of FIIs Registered from 2000-2010 
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Participatory Notes (PN) 
 
 
In December 2007, Assets under Management of FIIs nearly doubled year-over-year. 
Although this would normally be a reason to rejoice, almost 50% of FII flows in the previous 
two years were through an opaque financial instrument known as a Participatory Note. This 
section introduces and defines this instrument, and weighs its advantages against its 
disadvantages.  23 
PNs are a type of Offshore Derivative Instrument (ODI), and are unique to a few Asian 
countries, including India. The SEBI (FII) Regulations defines an ODI as an instrument “which 
is issued overseas by a foreign institutional investor against securities held by it that are listed or 
proposed to be listed on any recognised stock exchange in India.”24 These ODIs can also be 
issued against derivatives, resulting in leveraged exposure to the Indian Stock Market. 25  
Although there are other ODIs like equity-linked notes and capped return notes, PNs are the most 
common type of ODI.26  
PNs became a conduit for international investment in India since their inception around 
1992.27 In spite of the fact that the official rules on FIIs were released in 1995, these instruments 
were attractive for investors who were apprehensive, yet interested to enter the emerging Indian 
market. Theses instruments provide easy access to the Indian market. If an investor would like to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Mohan, TT Ram. "Neither Dread Nor Encourage Them." Economic and Political Weekly 
(2006): 95-99. 
24 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations, 1995. 
www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act07a.html 
25 Lokeshwarri S.K. “The Fading Allure Of P-Notes.” Business Daily. January 28, 2011 
26 Indian Securities Market Volume XIV 2011, www.nseindia.com/content/us/ismr_full2011.pdf, 
pg188 
27  Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
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buy securities or derivatives, he sends his order to the FII. This FII then conveys that order to his 
broker in India, who actually buys the securities. In return, PNs are issued to the FII, who then 
passes them on to its clients. 28 Apart from its ease of use, there are other factors that made a case 
for the creation of PNs. These instruments were freely tradable, which provided liquidity in the 
market.29 This liquidity was much required in the recently and partially liberalized Indian 
market. Participatory Notes provided a method for Mauritian individuals and companies to take 
advantage of the zero Capital Gains Tax accorded by the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement 
(DTAA).30 Investing through this instrument also significantly lowered the cost of entry into the 
Indian markets. Some of these costs include, the money required to establish broker or bank 
relations, costs associated with FII registration and subsequent disclosures, and costs associated 
with foreign exchange.31 
In the context of the aforementioned cost advantages over FIIs, one can deduce the higher 
premium of an individual transaction through PNs versus FIIs.32 Similarly, some of the other 
advantages of PNs are just one side of a double-edged sword.  
The first issue with PNs was the capital gains tax arbitrage opportunities that were 
created as a result of the DTAA. Onshore investors had to pay taxes up to 40% on short-term 
capital gains, compared to 0% in Mauritius. This led to an increase in the number of offshore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 N., Nikhil Kumar, Implications of Hedge Funds on the Indian Capital Market (August 20, 
2007) 
29 “White Paper on Black Money.” Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, India. 2012, pg 
27 
30 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
31 Report of the Expert Group on Encouraging FII Flows and Checking the Vulnerability of 
Capital Markets to Speculative Flows, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 2005 (also, Lahiri Committee), pg 16 
32 N., Nikhil Kumar, Implications of Hedge Funds on the Indian Capital Market (August 20, 
2007) 
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firms that registered in the country. Additionally, certified residents of Mauritius also had to pay 
minimal corporate tax, and therefore companies began routing their investments in India through 
Mauritius. 33 Between April 2000 and March 2011, Mauritius (41.8%) and Singapore (9.17%) 
accounted for over half of the cumulative FDI in India.34 These disproportionate inflows occur 
even though 8 years of the data set is cut out, and some arbitrage opportunities were nullified by 
2004, through the decrease in the tax rate on Indian onshore Capital Gains and the increase in the 
cost of setting up an establishment in Mauritius.35  
An organization that was against PNs from the start was the RBI. In its dissent of the 
Expert Group on FIIs, the RBI suggested winding down all PNs and ceasing further issues. They 
said that the suspicious and anonymous nature of the cash flows should be reason enough to shut 
PNs down. The anonymity could get further magnified once PNs are traded between foreign 
investors through a process they call “multi-layering.”36 This made it almost impossible to 
monitor entry into the Indian Market. In 2004, SEBI passed directives to curb these issues. They 
decreed that PNs could only be issued to regulated bodies. However, it was downplayed as a 
mere strengthening of Know Your Client (KYC) norms.37 SEBI rejected RBI’s proposal to ban 
PNs because they believed the financial community would have seen it as a recessive measure.38  
One problem that the government did not fix during the 2004 amendment was the 
plausibility of “Round-tripping.” Round-tripping is the process by which tax-free illicit or black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
34 “White Paper on Black Money.” Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, India. 2012. 
35 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
36 RBIs dissent to EG. “White Paper on Black Money.” Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Revenue, India. 2012. Annex IV 
37 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Board of India, January 23rd, 2004 
38 Vasudevan, A. "A Note on Portfolio Flows into India." Economic and Political Weekly 
(2006): 90-92. 
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money leaves India through illegal routes, and is then repatriated to the country with minimal 
fees. Since the official definition of regulated bodies includes an “individual or entity”39 whose 
investment advisory is regulated, PNs provide a perfect path to bring prodigal money back into 
the country.  The least probable issue, although still plausible, is the use of PNs by terrorists. 
High net worth terrorists could purchase PNs through their asset managers, and then gift the 
notes as payment, without paying any tax on the transfer. In spite of a longitudinal cross-section  
of society raising concerns about Participatory Notes, they are still traded in the market today. 
Therefore, to completely understand the situation today, it is important to be cognizant of the 
regulatory past. 
 
Regulatory timeline 
 
 
Participatory notes have caused friction with regulators in the countries that it exists. 
Taiwan introduced strong disclosure requirements for PNs in December 1999, but they rescinded 
those regulations 6 months later.40 The rules on PNs in India have been shaped by the regulatory 
changes in the past. The idea of an offshore instrument for investment in Indian securities 
probably stems from the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Mauritius. However, PNs 
first came into existence when the economy opened up in 1992.41 In conjunction with the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973, the Government of India guidelines released 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. Appendix II 
40 Report of the Expert Group on Encouraging FII Flows and Checking the Vulnerability of 
Capital Markets to Speculative Flows, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 2005 (also, Lahiri Committee), pg 45 
41 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
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on 14th September 1992 provided a framework for foreign investment in India.42 The official 
guidelines for PNs came out in 1995 as part of SEBIs rules on FIIs.  
Since then there have been a number of amendments to the rules, but only a few of them have 
significantly affected PNs. 
The first major amendment was probably made in January 2004. The RBI had voiced its 
issues with PNs in 2003. It believed that the opacity, and the ease of acquiring, of these 
instruments created more risk than benefit for the economic stability of India. Since the end-user 
of this instrument was unknown, it could be used not only for fraudulent purposes but also for 
malicious purposes, as detailed above. In order to alleviate these qualms, SEBI decided to install 
robust Know Your Customer (KYC) norms. They also stipulated that FIIs could only issue them 
to other “regulated”43 entities. In spite of these changes, the PN volumes continued to rise until 
more than half of FII assets were in the form of PNs. These high volumes proved a cause for 
concern because PNs were highly attractive instruments even though SEBI controlled the 
anonymity of the instrument. The increase in companies routing their investments through 
Mauritius alluded to the fact that investors were taking advantage of the tax arbitrage 
opportunities presented by PNs. Regulators were also worried simply about the high volumes, 
because a mass international exodus from the Indian stock markets could have a major impact on 
the market, possibly affecting domestic investor confidence. On October 26th, 2007, SEBI issued 
a statement in regard to curbing PN flows. These measures were implemented in the amendment 
made on 22nd May 2008.  There were three fundamental changes these measures made. Firstly, 
sub-accounts were disallowed from issuing PNs. Secondly, PNs on derivatives had to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Indian Securities Market Volume XIV 2011, www.nseindia.com/content/us/ismr_full2011.pdf 
43 Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
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completely wound up by 2009. Thirdly, there was a 40% ceiling imposed on PNs as a percent of 
the total AuC. Fourthly, companies that were below this ceiling were allowed to increase their 
percentage of PNs by a maximum of 5% each year.44 These complicated norms created a sense 
of unease within foreign investors, and they began to offload more than just their PNs issued on 
derivatives. Although this could be explained as the unraveling of derivative included strategies 
such as a Protective Put, SEBI decided to rectify the changes made in May.  Apart from sub-
accounts not being able to issue PNs, all other changes were revoked. 45  In 2012 the government 
decided to cut down the time lag on reporting PN transactions from 6 months to 10 days.  
Although PNs are not close to the levels of 2007, they have been increasing in numbers 
recently. In light of this fact, it is important to understand the effects of this instrument on the 
stability of the Indian Rupee. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations 
amendment 22nd May, 2008. www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act07a.html 
45 Securities And Exchange Board Of India (Foreign Institutional Investors) Regulations 
amendment 10th Oct, 2008. www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act07a.html 
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Literature Review 
 
 
The Narasimham committee of 1991 suggested against allowing investments from NRIs 
because of the volatility associated with those cash flows.46 However, they offer no empirical 
evidence confirming this volatility. The Narasimham committee suggested against NRI flows out 
of skepticism caused by the mass outflow of NRI investments right before the 1992 Balance of 
Payments crisis. Ironically, instruments still exist today, which could have more volatile cash 
flows than the NRI flows. Before we understand the effects of those specific instruments, it is 
important to understand the overarching effects of FIIs on the Indian stock market. Rai and 
Bhanumurthy47 used monthly data to determine that equity returns are the main determinants of 
FII investment. Dhiman48 confirmed their findings when he concluded that the average daily 
returns of the NSE granger caused the daily purchase to sales ratio of FIIs. Mohan49 pointed out 
that FII flows accounted for 69% of all foreign investment in India, as compared to an average of 
20% for developing countries. He predicted that FII flows were more volatile than FDI flows, 
thus leading to a greater relative volatility in Indian markets as compared to other emerging 
markets. However, using an event study methodology in his other study, Mohan50 found that on 
the contrary FII flow volatility did not systematically affect the stock market. He cited the “Black 
Monday” crash of May 2004 when the stock market was resilient to an eight-sigma volatility, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Bhasin, Niti. Banking and financial markets in India, 1947 to 2007. New Century Publications, 
2007. 
47 Rai, Kulwant, and N. R. Bhanumurthy. "Determinants of foreign institutional investment in 
India: The role of return, risk, and inflation." The Developing Economies 42.4 (2004): 479-493. 
48 Dhiman, Rahul. “Impact Of Foreign Institutional Investor On The Stock Market” 
International Journal in Research of Finance and Marketing 2.4 (2012):32-46. 49	  Mohan, TT Ram. "Stock market fall: Managing volatile flows." Economic and Political 
Weekly (2006): 2411-2413. 50	  Mohan, TT Ram. "Neither Dread Nor Encourage Them." Economic and Political Weekly 
(2006): 95-99. 
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spite of FII outflows. Therefore it seems that FII outflows do not create enough instability to 
result in a mass sell-of in the Indian market. 
The one way that FIIs create weakness in the Indian economy is through the exchange 
rate. According to Chandrasekhar51 large FII inflows lead to an appreciation of the Rupee, 
hurting the exports of the country, even though it makes imports cheaper. Conversely, large FII 
outflows depreciate the value of the Rupee, increasing exports and making imports more 
expensive. In order to mitigate the rise in Rupee, the RBI buys foreign exchange. However, this 
affects their ability to control domestic money supply. In order to avoid this problem, before 
2006, the RBI would sell government securities equal to the value of foreign exchange 
purchased. The Lahiri Report52 raises concerns about the enhanced volatility of PN flows. It 
claims that individuals, who determine their own entry and exit and usually have shorter 
investment horizons than investment funds, are able to hold PNs. Further, Singh53 states that 
regulators attribute the cause of the May 2004 and the May/June 2006 FII sell-offs to an initial 
sell-off from PN investors.  
As a result of its ability to drive other FII flows, PN flows should contribute to a greater 
change in the Indian Rupee exchange rate than other FII inflows. Vasudevan54 states that there 
has been no empirical analysis done on the vulnerability of PN cash flows, but unfortunately 
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  Chandrasekhar, C. P. "Courting Risk: Policy Manoeuvres on FII Inflows." Economic and 
Political Weekly (2006): 92-95. 52	  Report of the Expert Group on Encouraging FII Flows and Checking the Vulnerability of 
Capital Markets to Speculative Flows, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of 
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  Singh, Manmohan. Use of Participatory Notes in Indian Equity Markets and Recent 
Regulatory Changes. Vol. 7. International Monetary Fund, 2007.	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doesn’t go on to do any himself. There is very little research about the effect of PNs, specifically, 
on the Indian Rupee.   
The aim of this paper is to clarify the beliefs about PNs and verify whether it truly creates 
more exchange rate volatility than other FII flows.  
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Data and Methodology 
 
 
The data used in this empirical study is monthly time-series data from September 2003 to 
September 2012. Monthly data was used over quarterly or yearly data because it was the highest 
frequency of data that was available. This high frequency of data was preferred because it maps 
the regulatory changes and the movement of the exchange rate as closely as possible.  The 
variables involved in this empirical study are described below. These variables were selected to 
try and explain the movement of the exchange rate while controlling for confounding factors. 
Individual descriptions and details for the variables are stated below. 
 
United States Dollar/Indian Rupee Exchange Rate (USDINR): 
 This variable is the nominal exchange rate between the US Dollar and the Indian Rupee. 
It was sourced from the Global Financial Database. It is the dependent variable in the regression. 
It would be an appropriate measure of currency strength because the performance of the Indian 
Rupee is practically always compared to the US Dollar. Similarly, it is also preferred to the real 
exchange rate because the nominal exchange rate decides transactions. It was preferred to the 
trade-weighted exchange rate because it is easier to isolate all other effects of just one country, 
and hence understand the variables that affect the strength of the INR. The change in USDINR 
was calculated using the following formula: 
𝑐ℎ𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑅 = 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑅!𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑅!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. Closing values at month-end were used. 
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United States Dollar Spot Index (USDXY):  
USDINR can be affected by changes in both India and the United States. Therefore, the 
USDXY variable is introduced to control against changes in the US Dollar. This variable 
represents the index that measures the strength of the US Dollar against a basket of six other 
major currencies, not including the Indian Rupee. The change in USDXY was calculated using 
the following formula: 
𝑐ℎ𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑌 = 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑌!𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑌!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. Closing values at month-end were used. 
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI):  
 CPI is the total value of the average basket of goods required by a consumer. The percent 
change in this number relates to the Inflation for the country.  This variable is used to measure 
the real effects on the dependent variable, separate from inflation. Data for this was sourced from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the United States and from the Labour Bureau for India. 
Inflation is given by the formula: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐶𝑃𝐼!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. Closing values at month-end were used. 
 
Total Value of Participatory Notes (TVPN):  
 This variable represents the total monetary value of PNs in Rupees Crore (10 million). It 
is the most important independent variable in this regression. This variable was the restricting 
variable in the regression, because data was only available from September 2003 onwards. This 
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data was derived from the SEBI website. The change in TVPN was calculated using the 
following formula: 
𝑐ℎ𝑇𝑉𝑃𝑁 = 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑃𝑁!𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑉𝑃𝑁!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. This change represents the net PN flows each month. 
 
Assets under Custody, Foreign Institutional Investors (AUCFII): 
 This variable represents the total value of Assets Under FII Custody. The data for this 
variable is also sourced from the SEBI website, and has the same restriction as the data for 
TVPN. 
 
AUCFII excluding PNs (AUCNPN): 
 This variable is derived by following formula: 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑁 = 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝐹𝐼𝐼 − 𝑇𝑉𝑃𝑁 
Since it is formed from restricting variables, AUCNPN is also restricted. It is used in this specific 
way in order to view all other FII investments as separate from PN investments. 
The change in AUCNPN was calculated using the following formula: 
𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑁 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑁!𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑁!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. Similar to TVPN, the change represents the net AUCNPN flows 
for each month.  
 
Broad Money (M3):  
Broad Money is defined as the sum of currency with the public, demand deposits time 
deposits and other deposits with the RBI. An increase in broad money increases the Rupee 
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supply in the Market, and vice versa. The change in Reserve was calculated using the following 
formula: 
𝑐ℎ𝑀3 = 𝑙𝑛𝑀3!𝑙𝑛𝑀3!!! − 1 
where m is the current month. The data was sourced from the online RBI database. 
 
RBI Government Securities Turnover (RBI): 
Open Market Operations are the market operations conducted by the Reserve Bank of 
India by way of sale/ purchase of Government securities to/ from the market with an objective to 
adjust the rupee liquidity conditions in the market on a durable basis. 55 A sale of securities 
increases the Rupee liquidity in the Market, and vice versa. This variable takes into consideration 
the effect of sterilization mentioned in the PN section. The absolute value of turnover was used, 
and the data was sourced from the online RBI database. 
 
Note: Broad Money and government securities turnover is reported every week and thus there is 
lead or lag in the time of the data by 1-2 days. However, I do not perceive this to be a big issue, 
because the securities are sold every Wednesday, and the data is reported every Friday. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 RBI FAQs - http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=79# 
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  . 
        dRBI         108   -.3507408    93.57357       -329     480.24
         RBI         109    54.81645    102.3259        .35     542.79
  dInflation         108    .0000433    .0119457  -.0407474   .0389292
   Inflation         109    .0060322    .0092756  -.0389292   .0457516
       dchM3         108   -3.85e-07    .0015368  -.0052324    .003895
                                                                      
        chM3         109    .0012645    .0010606   -.000453   .0056467
    chAUCNPN         109    .0019653    .0075043  -.0229478   .0211312
      chTVPN         109    .0016573    .0113841   -.035618     .03202
     chUSDXY         109   -.0002915    .0058287  -.0153525   .0171213
    chUSDINR         109    .0003673    .0063485  -.0172543   .0177713
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Variables of Interest 
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Analysis 
 
Note: Appendix A is a STATA supplement to the analysis. 
One of the first tests that needs to be conducted with time-series data is a test for 
stationary data. This kind of test is also called a unit root test. A unit root occurs when a specific 
event in history creates a systematic effect on the regressand. If this effect is not controlled for, a 
“spurious” regression could occur. This could manifest itself as a high R2, even if the variables 
are uncorrelated.   
 In order to check for this problem, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was performed. This 
test is preferred to the basic Dickey-Fuller test because it takes into consideration the lagged 
changes in in the variable. Since the data had monthly frequency, a lag of 12 periods was used. 
The null hypothesis was that a unit root exists, and the alternative hypothesis stated that it didn’t 
exist. 
 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
 
Number Variable Test Statistic MacKinnon 
P-Value 
Stationary 
1 chUSDINR -3.514 0.0076 Yes 
2 chUSDXY -4.596 0.0001 Yes 
3 chTVPN -2.703 0.0736 Yes 
4 chAUCNPN -3.167 0.0220 Yes 
5 chM3 -1.990 0.6067 No 
6 RBI -2.666 0.2503 No 
7 Inflation -2.360 0.4013 No 
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The test was significant at the 5% threshold and thus I rejected the null hypothesis for variables 
1-4. However, we failed to reject the null for variables 5-7, and the data was not stationary. In 
order to try and obtain stationary data for chM3, RBI, and Inflation, I created first differenced 
variables using STATA, for each one. The first difference eliminates the effect of the unit root 
because the persisting change between the two numbers is eliminated. The Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test was run again on those differenced variables, and the results were as follows: 
 
Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test after First Differencing 
 
Number Variable Test Statistic MacKinnon P-
Value 
Stationary 
1 dchM3 -6.988 0.0000 Yes 
2 dRBI -4.480 0.0002 Yes 
3 dInflation -5.852 0.0000 Yes 
 
These first-differenced variables were significantly stationary at the 1% critical level. In order to 
try and decide how to proceed, one can try and examine the volatility distribution of the 
regressand. To meet this, chUSDINR was regressed against the other six dependent variables 
according to the following equation: 
 𝑐ℎ𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑅 =   𝛽! +   𝛽! ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑋𝑌 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑇𝑉𝑃𝑁 + 𝛽!∗ 𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑈𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑁 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑀3+ 𝛽! ∗ 𝑑𝑅𝐵𝐼 + 𝛽!∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑢 
 
and then u was plot against Months. 
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From this graph, it didn’t look like error volatility was clustered or conditionally heteroskedastic. 
However, this can be evaluated through a post-test. Out of the three vertical separators, the one 
on the left is for October 2007, which is when a PN and FII sell-off was triggered when the  
Indian Government announced they were going to cap the value of PNs and completely ban the 
sale of PNs on derivatives. The middle line represents when the government withdrew the 
measures in October 2008, and the one to the right represents the month after the United States 
“officially”56 came out of its recession. I expected that the exchange rate volatility would have 
been larger between the first two bands as a result of the fragile state of the U.S. economy and 
foreign inflows into India. Although there is an increase in volatility, the presence of the 
USDXY variable probably mitigated the clustering effect. Therefore I decided against using 	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  According	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  Economic	  Research	  
Figure	  2:	  A	  plot	  of	  the	  Residuals	  against	  their	  Months	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Autoregressive Conditional Hetereoskedasticity (ARCH) or General Autoregressive Conditional 
Hetereoskedasticity (GARCH) models to begin to fit my data.  
The next logical step was to try and use the Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model. The 
VAR model compares each variable and its lags to all the other variables and their lags. This 
model is a powerful analytic tool just because it allows observation of multiple interactions. 
However, before running a VAR, it is important to ensure that there is no co-integration between 
any two series over time. Just like non-stationary data, co-integrated time series data could lead 
to a “spurious” regression. To prevent this from occurring, a Johansen test was administered, for 
which the lag had to be determined.  The “varsoc” function was used in STATA to generate 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and establish the lag as 1. The Johansen test was 
subsequently performed, with the null hypothesis stating that the time series’ were not co-
integrated. The resulting trace statistic exceeded 5% for all ranks, and therefore we failed to 
reject the null hypothesis. The series’ were not co-integrated, and therefore the unrestricted VAR 
model could be implemented using a lag of 1 and 2. STATA created a system of 105 equations, 
in which each variable was regressed against 1 lag and 2 lags of all the other variables, and a 
constant. The VAR came up with several significant coefficients, some of which stood out. Four 
separate variables were correlated with chAUCNPN, which I thought was interesting because it 
alludes to the fact that the institutionalized investeor develops his data from multiple sources. I 
also found it interesting that as expected, inflation and sometimes lagged inflation correlated 
with the change in USDINR and the change in M3. However, both these inferences were 
rendered moot by another one. All the lagged variables significantly correlated with their own 
variable. This reeked of autocorrelation, and hence I performed a Lagrange Multiplier test of 
serial correlation on the VAR. As feared, the statistic turned out to be significant at Lag 2, and I 
had to begin again.  
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Had the VAR worked without errors, there would have been some interesting 
relationships to analyze. The most interesting part about a VAR is that one can also observe the 
relationship with lagged variables. The first effect that would have been interesting to identify 
would be the relationship between the chTVPN and the chUSDINR variable. I would have 
expected the coefficient to be positive and significant at the 5 % level. However, it would have 
been more interesting to compare the coefficients on chTVPN and chAUCNPN with respect to 
chUSDINR. Assuming chAUCNPN would have been significant, this comparison would have 
revealed whether PNs had a greater effect on the USD/INR exchange rate than all other kinds of 
FII flows. The lagged variable wouldn’t have revealed very much justifiable information because 
of the one-month frequency. 
The lagged relationship between Inflation and chUSDINR, as well as RBI and 
chUSDINR would have been interesting to note. Assuming the relationships were significant, it 
would have been useful to make sure that both the lagged regressors affected the regressand with 
a positive coefficient.  
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Discussion 
 
 
One of the limitations that this study had was the monthly frequency of the data. 
Exchange rates tend to fluctuate every day. In fact, in Balance of Trade crises, countries like 
India have devalued their currencies by over 20% in day. However, the fact that the data was 
monthly, helped keep out some of the potential outliers from the daily data. 
Probably the biggest flaw in the paper is the serial or autocorrelation, notorious to time-
series data. A simple Breusch-Godfrey statistic brought to light the issue that had existed right 
after the first regression was modeled. 
 
 
 
After I realized my mistake, I went back and rejected the null hypothesis, and then in order to 
account for the serial correlation, I first-differenced the other variables. These variables were 
then regressed again, and another Breusch-Godfrey Statistic was found. However, this time the 
p-value was even greater than the initial statistic, all of which can be seen in Appendix A. I 
believe this effect may have occurred because of three possible reasons: the first could have been 
because some of the variables were already in percent changes. The second reason could have 
. drop chTVPN[1]
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                3.636               1                   0.0565
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. bgodfrey
Table 4: The Breusch-Godfrey LM Statistic for the Initial Linear Regression  
	   36	  
been the lower bound on the TVPN and AUCNPN data caused a problem to differencing. 
Another possible reason could have been the existence of multicollinearity between the 
dependent variables. If it was strong enough, and in a specific direction, it could have thrown off 
the standard errors by enough to make the test statistics insignificant. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Although my VAR test failed to provide conclusive data on the experiment, from all the data and 
information I have come across, PNs do not seem to have as big as an impact on the exchange 
rate as the Indian Media makes it out to have. Initially there was definitely a big reason to be 
concerned about PNs. Since the end-user was not known, there were many possible illegal uses 
of the instrument, as mentioned in this thesis. Let’s look at the question of illegal money re-
entering the country. Although the government ends up loosing tax gains in the short term, it 
repatriates money back into India in the long term. In any case the government of India has set 
up charity schemes, through which people can begin to convert their illegal money into legal 
money by paying a small fee.  
 From the many non-empirical analyses that I had to go through before I could write this 
thesis, I would like to straw man two of the prominent volatility-related arguments that people 
make against PNs. The first is the belief that when PN investors buy stocks, they do it as 
speculators and not investors. This means they have an approximate investment horizon of less 
than a year and bet on the market moving in a certain direction in that short horizon, instead of 
expecting the company they invest in to do well in either case. I have two issues with that. For 
the sake of argument, lets assume that all PN users are speculators, the speculation can only be 
dangerous to the Rupee in the situation of a fear-driven, or irrational dumping of PNs. This is 
still no reason to bar a financial instrument. In the worlds largest democracy (by population) I 
pity the people who ascribe to cowardly politics instead of welcoming international competition. 
The second problem I have with that claim is the fact that foreigners are stereotyped as 
speculators. In some situations, firms may want to increase their risk exposure to India, or they 
may want to hedge against their currency. Either way for the most part, these decisions are well 
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thought of investment strategies, in riskier countries with higher costs of Capital. The second and 
probably biggest problem I have with PN critics is this belief of ‘Herd Mentality’ in foreign 
investors. There has been some scientific work linking emotionally driven economic decision-
making being linked to information asymmetry, which many foreign investors in India 
experience. Although there might be a financial basis for this potential sell-off in the future, it 
does not warrant prejudice against the foreign investment community, or one of its vehicles in 
India today. In spite of this, in a follow-up study, if it were found that the PNs do have an 
adverse effect on the INR, it would be wise for the Indian government’s finance ministry to pass 
laws better limiting the sale and trade of PNs.  
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Appendix A: STATA OUTPUT and SOME MANIPULATIONS 	  	  
1.	  	  
.  dfuller chUSDINR, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
 
Z(t)             -3.514            -3.517            -2.894            -2.582 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0076 
 
 
. dfuller chUSDXY, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
 
Z(t)             -4.596            -3.517            -2.894            -2.582 
  
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001 
 
 
. dfuller chTVPN, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
 
Z(t)             -2.703            -3.517            -2.894            -2.582 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0736 
 
 
. dfuller chAUCNPN, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
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---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
 
Z(t)             -3.167            -3.517            -2.894            -2.582 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0220 
 
. dfuller chM3, lags(12) trend 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -1.990            -4.051            -3.455            -3.153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.6067 
 
 
. dfuller RBI, lags(12) trend 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -2.666            -4.051            -3.455            -3.153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.2503 
 
 
. dfuller Inflation, lags(12) trend 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        95 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -2.360            -4.051            -3.455            -3.153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.4013 
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. dfuller dchM3, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        94 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -6.988            -3.518            -2.895            -2.582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller dRBI, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        94 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -4.480            -3.518            -2.895            -2.582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0002 
 
. dfuller dInflation, lags(12) 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        94 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.852            -3.518            -2.895            -2.582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
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2.	  	  
	  	  .	  predict	  res1,	  r	  (3	  missing	  values	  generated)	  	  .	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
                                                                              
       _cons     .0011491   .0004691     2.45   0.016     .0002185    .0020796
        dRBI     3.98e-07   4.93e-06     0.08   0.936    -9.39e-06    .0000102
  dInflation    -.0549006   .0388463    -1.41   0.161    -.1319612    .0221599
       dchM3    -.1968207   .3013988    -0.65   0.515    -.7947148    .4010733
    chAUCNPN    -.2260905   .0698298    -3.24   0.002     -.364614    -.087567
      chTVPN    -.1123166   .0447407    -2.51   0.014    -.2010701   -.0235631
     chUSDXY     .4747286   .0832284     5.70   0.000     .3096259    .6398313
                                                                              
    chUSDINR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .004352597   107  .000040678           Root MSE      =   .0047
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4559
    Residual    .002235628   101  .000022135           R-squared     =  0.4864
       Model    .002116969     6  .000352828           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   101) =   15.94
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     108
. reg chUSDINR chUSDXY chTVPN chAUCNPN dchM3 dInflation dRBI
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3.`	  graph	  twoway	  line	  res1	  Month	  	  
	  	  
4.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  . 
    Exogenous:  chUSDXY chTVPN chAUCNPN dchM3 dRBI dInflation  _cons
   Endogenous:  chUSDINR
                                                                               
     4    418.586  2.5433    1  0.111  .000023  -7.83819  -7.72487  -7.55849   
     3    417.314  .16348    1  0.686  .000023  -7.83296  -7.72995   -7.5787   
     2    417.232  1.6845    1  0.194  .000023  -7.85062  -7.75791  -7.62178   
     1     416.39  .45564    1  0.500  .000023  -7.85366  -7.77125  -7.65024   
     0    416.162                      .000022* -7.86851*  -7.7964* -7.69052*  
                                                                               
   lag      LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
                                                                               
   Sample:  Jan 2004 - Aug 2012                 Number of obs      =       104
   Selection-order criteria
. varsoc chUSDINR, exog(chUSDXY chTVPN chAUCNPN dchM3 dRBI dInflation)
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5.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
6.	  	  
	  
                                                                               
    7      56      1805.3922     0.36180
    6      55      1781.8147     0.44548     47.1551     3.76
    5      52      1750.8581     0.56070    109.0683    15.41
    4      47       1707.673     0.63082    195.4384    29.68
    3      40      1655.3586     0.66074    300.0672    47.21
    2      31       1598.607     0.73330    413.5705    68.52
    1      20      1529.2217     0.80987    552.3411    94.15
    0      7        1442.068           .    726.6484   124.24
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value
maximum                                      trace    critical
                                                         5%
                                                                               
Sample:  Dec 2003 - Aug 2012                                     Lags =       1
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =     105
                       Johansen tests for cointegration                        
. vecrank chUSDINR chUSDXY chTVPN chAUCNPN dchM3 dRBI dInflation, lag(1)
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001856   .0006273     0.30   0.767    -.0010438     .001415
              
         L2.    -6.84e-06   6.43e-06    -1.06   0.287    -.0000195    5.77e-06
         L1.    -1.52e-06   6.69e-06    -0.23   0.820    -.0000146    .0000116
        dRBI  
              
         L2.     .0868708   .0589421     1.47   0.141    -.0286535    .2023951
         L1.     .1772865   .0546875     3.24   0.001     .0701011     .284472
  dInflation  
              
         L2.     .2766459   .4274654     0.65   0.518    -.5611709    1.114463
         L1.     .6210479   .4468315     1.39   0.165    -.2547257    1.496821
       dchM3  
              
         L2.      .119262   .0911398     1.31   0.191    -.0593687    .2978928
         L1.     .0763586   .0938955     0.81   0.416    -.1076733    .2603904
    chAUCNPN  
              
         L2.     -.074831   .0587907    -1.27   0.203    -.1900586    .0403966
         L1.    -.0584354    .061371    -0.95   0.341    -.1787204    .0618495
      chTVPN  
              
         L2.     .1658357   .1191602     1.39   0.164    -.0677141    .3993855
         L1.    -.0672624   .1232086    -0.55   0.585    -.3087469    .1742221
     chUSDXY  
              
         L2.    -.1783786   .1387755    -1.29   0.199    -.4503737    .0936165
         L1.     .2460982   .1312475     1.88   0.061    -.0111422    .5033386
    chUSDINR  
chUSDINR      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                
dRBI                 15      86.062   0.2591   37.06522   0.0007
dInflation           15     .010497   0.3389   54.34967   0.0000
dchM3                15     .001276   0.4019   71.22096   0.0000
chAUCNPN             15     .007423   0.1434   17.74913   0.2184
chTVPN               15     .010849   0.2323   32.07855   0.0039
chUSDXY              15     .006102   0.0680   7.730514   0.9029
chUSDINR             15     .006171   0.2023   26.88937   0.0199
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.36e-24                         SBIC            = -30.47234
FPE            =  9.97e-24                         HQIC            = -32.04133
Log likelihood =  1859.864                         AIC             = -33.11065
Sample:  Dec 2003 - Sep 2012                       No. of obs      =       106
Vector autoregression
. var chUSDINR chUSDXY chTVPN chAUCNPN dchM3 dInflation dRBI, lag(1 2)
	   47	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  
	  
         L2.    -.1783786   .1387755    -1.29   0.199    -.4503737    .0936165
         L1.     .2460982   .1312475     1.88   0.061    -.0111422    .5033386
    chUSDINR  
chUSDINR      
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
         L2.     .0868708   .0589421     1.47   0.141    -.0286535    .2023951
         L1.     .1772865   .0546875     3.24   0.001     .0701011     .284472
dInflation
    chUSDINR  
chUSDXY       
                                             
         L2.     -.052197   .0581317    -0.90   0.369    -.1661331    .0617391
         L1.    -.1132866   .0606831    -1.87   0.062    -.2322233      .00565
  chTVPN
         L2.    -.0200228   .2439804    -0.08   0.935    -.4982156      .45817
         L1.    -.7192643   .2307454    -3.12   0.002    -1.171517   -.2670116
    chUSDINR  
chTVPN        
                                              
                                                                              
_cons  019712 0011028  1 79 074 0001902 .00 1326
         L1.     -.175022   .1578714    -1.11   0.268    -.4844441    .1344002
    chUSDINR  
chAUCNPN      
              
2 .3280637 669265  97 049  0008939 6552336
         L1.    -.0353152   .1482018    -0.24   0.812    -.3257854    .2551549
chUSDXY
              
2 2620619 33322 1 83 067 5429 78 018863
         L2.     .0964713   .0707165     1.36   0.173    -.0421305    .2350731
         L1.     .1743466   .0738202     2.36   0.018     .0296617    .3190316
chTVPN
                                                                              
_cons 016634 0 54 2 20 027  00 846 0031422
    chUSDINR  
dchM3         
              
         L2.    -.0293989   .0121867    -2.41   0.016    -.0532844   -.0055133
         L1.    -.0382377   .0113071    -3.38   0.001    -.0603992   -.0160763
  dInflation  
              
         L2.     -.260749    .088382    -2.95   0.003    -.4339745   -.0875236
         L1.    -.6366976    .092386    -6.89   0.000    -.8177709   -.4556243
   dchM3
    chUSDINR  
dInflation    
                                                                
              
         L2.    -.2799954   .1002627    -2.79   0.005    -.4765067    -.083484
         L1.    -.5587198   .0930255    -6.01   0.000    -.7410464   -.3763932
dInflation
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7.	  
	  
	  
8.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
              
         L2.    -3396.753   1935.392    -1.76   0.079    -7190.052    396.5455
         L1.      4473.99   1830.405     2.44   0.015     886.4626    8061.517
    chUSDINR  
dRBI          
                                                                              
              
         L2.    -.1681707   .0897174    -1.87   0.061    -.3440136    .0076722
         L1.    -.2825879    .093232    -3.03   0.002    -.4653192   -.0998565
dRBI
   H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
                                          
      2      64.5057    49     0.06785    
      1      58.6423    49     0.16281    
                                          
    lag         chi2    df   Prob > chi2  
                                          
   Lagrange-multiplier test
. varlmar
. drop chTVPN[1]
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       1                3.636               1                   0.0565
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. bgodfrey
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9.	  	  
	                          H0: no serial correlation                                                                           
       1               13.004               1                   0.0003
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. bgodfrey
                                                                              
       d2RBI    -2.44e-06   3.95e-06    -0.62   0.538    -.0000103    5.39e-06
       d2Inf    -.0662863   .0291876    -2.27   0.025    -.1241866    -.008386
        d2M3    -.1614567   .2231376    -0.72   0.471    -.6041018    .2811884
   dchAUCNPN     -.235586   .0591257    -3.98   0.000    -.3528755   -.1182965
     dchTVPN    -.0565114   .0399012    -1.42   0.160    -.1356646    .0226419
    dchUSDXY     .4866393   .0715082     6.81   0.000     .3447863    .6284922
                                                                              
   dchUSDINR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .00701796   107  .000065588           Root MSE      =  .00591
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4684
    Residual    .003521833   101   .00003487           R-squared     =  0.4982
       Model    .003496127     6  .000582688           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   101) =   16.71
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     107
. reg dchUSDINR dchUSDXY dchTVPN dchAUCNPN d2M3 d2Inf d2RBI, noc
